<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/">
  <channel>
    <title>Pentester.ca Blog</title>
    <link>https://pentester.ca/blog</link>
    <description>Security research, industry commentary, and stories from the field by Kaeden at Pentester.ca.</description>
    <language>en-ca</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
    <atom:link href="https://pentester.ca/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>tl;dv (Too Lazy; Didn't Validate): 181,874 Meetings Left Wide Open</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/tldv-hack</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/tldv-hack</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How a missing Firestore security rule on tl;dv exposed 181,874 meetings from 84,312 users across 35,003 domains, including live calls I could join uninvited, and how six months of disclosure got me nothing but seen receipts.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Click to Pray, Click to Leak: The Pope's Official App Exposes 700,000+ User Emails</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/click-to-pray</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/click-to-pray</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How I found that anyone can pull the email address, name, country, and date of birth of any of the 719,517 users on Click To Pray, the Pope's official prayer app, with a single GET request. Reported January 3rd. Still live six months later. Nobody has ever responded.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>I Could've Rickrolled the Entire FIFA World Cup. All I Needed Was My ID.</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/fifa-hack</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/fifa-hack</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How I found that anyone could register on FIFA's public Agent Platform, gain access to the Football Data Platform's Streaming Management panel, and get RTMP ingest URLs and stream keys for every live FIFA World Cup 2026 camera feed. I then spent hours calling FIFA, MediaKind, HBS, CISA, and the FBI trying to get someone to pick up the phone.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Your Boarding Pass Is a Skeleton Key. Frontier Airlines Doesn't Care.</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/frontier-airlines-hack</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/frontier-airlines-hack</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How I found that anyone with a boarding pass photo can pull full passport numbers, home addresses, children's dates of birth, credit card details, and Known Traveler Numbers for every passenger on a Frontier Airlines booking. Reported March 3rd. Still live 105 days later.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Your Google Calendar Is Probably Public. Here's Why That's Terrifying.</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/google-calendar-public</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/google-calendar-public</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Google Calendar has a setting that makes your entire calendar visible to anyone with your email address. Not just your availability. Full event details: titles, descriptions, attendees, Zoom links with passwords, and any documents linked in the description. All anyone needs is your email and a URL like calendar.google.com/calendar/u/0/embed?src=you@company.com. No authentication. No notification to the owner. This whole rabbit hole started by accident. I was doing security research on MSCHF, the viral product company behind Big Red Boots and Blur, and ran an employee's email through GHunt, an OSINT tool. It flagged their Google Calendar as public. I clicked through, and suddenly I was looking at every upcoming product drop planned through 2025, internal meeting notes, and links to Google Docs, Spreadsheets, and Figma files that were viewable by anyone. One spreadsheet contained celebrity addresses.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Your Lowest-Paid Employee Can Probably See Everything</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/lowest-paid-employee</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/lowest-paid-employee</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Companies spend millions on firewalls, endpoint detection, and perimeter security. Then they give a part-time employee the keys to the kingdom. This is one of the most common patterns I find in my security research, and one of the least talked about. It's not about hackers breaking in from the outside. It's about what's already accessible from the inside, to people who were never supposed to see it.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Fix That Wasn't: Why Outsourced Dev Teams Are Your Biggest Security Risk</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/outsourced-dev-teams</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/outsourced-dev-teams</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>There's a conversation I have over and over again. A company hires an agency to build their app. The app ships. It works. Everyone is happy. Then someone like me takes a look, and the whole thing falls apart. And you better hope it's someone like me, not someone who wants to exploit it. This isn't about where developers are located. Talented engineers exist everywhere. This is about a business model where agencies are incentivized to ship features fast, security isn't in the contract, and nobody checks the work.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>You Paid $50K for a Pentest. You Didn't Get One.</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/you-paid-50k-for-a-pentest</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/you-paid-50k-for-a-pentest</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 29 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>I'm going to tell you something big cybersecurity doesn't want you to hear: the pentest you paid for probably wasn't a pentest. I've lost count of how many times I've disclosed critical vulnerabilities to a company, only to hear: "That's weird, we just had a pentest done and they said we were clean." At this point, hearing that a company recently passed a security assessment is almost a leading indicator that I'm about to find something bad.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>If It's on the Internet, It Will Get Attacked.</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/if-its-on-the-internet-it-will-get-attacked</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/if-its-on-the-internet-it-will-get-attacked</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>A developer at a Fortune 500 company I work with had an attitude problem when it came to security. He didn't think it mattered much for the things he built. Nobody would bother attacking it. Nobody would be interested. It wasn't important enough to be a target. He was wrong. And I have two stories that prove it.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Petlibro: Your Pet Feeder Is Feeding Data To Anyone Who Asks</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/petlibro</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/petlibro</guid>
      <pubDate>Sat, 27 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How I found critical vulnerabilities in Petlibro smart pet feeders allowing complete account takeover via broken OAuth, access to anyone's pet data, device hijacking, and private audio recordings - and how they're still leaving the auth bypass active for 'legacy compatibility' two months later.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bandsintown: How I Almost Rickrolled 191k People</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/bandsintown</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/bandsintown</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How I found a verification bypass in Bandsintown that let anyone claim unclaimed artist pages with a single API call - including Rick Astley's 191k followers, their emails, and the ability to send push notifications as any artist.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Taimi: Finding Everyone's Private Photos Was Easy, But So Was Getting Paid</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/taimi-idor</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/taimi-idor</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How I found critical IDOR vulnerabilities in Taimi that exposed "expiring" videos, private photos through a bizarre location feature, and allowed fake system messages - and how they actually handled it right with a $10k bounty.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>I Hacked BellaBot and Every Robot from China's Biggest Robotics Company (Pudu Only Fixed It When I Told Their Clients)</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/hacked-biggest-chinese-robot-company</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/hacked-biggest-chinese-robot-company</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Critical vulnerabilities in Pudu Robotics allowed unauthorized control of every Pudu Robotics Robot worldwide. They ignored emails until I contacted Skylark Holdings and Zensho about their compromised robot fleets.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How I Hacked India's Biggest Dating App (They Offered Me a $100 Gift Card)</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/indias-biggest-dating-app-hacked</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/indias-biggest-dating-app-hacked</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Flutrr, India's biggest dating app backed by The Times of India, has critical security flaws allowing anyone to access all user data, send messages as anyone, and control any account. They've known since November 2024 and offered me $100.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>When South Park's Restaurant Had Worse Security Than Cartman's Password</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/i-hacked-southpark</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/i-hacked-southpark</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 17 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How I found critical security vulnerabilities in Matt Stone and Trey Parker's Casa Bonita restaurant, exposing customer data, payment info, and their entire POS system - plus how I accidentally got a Founders Club membership card 6 months later.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How I Hacked McDonald's (Their Security Contact Was Harder to Find Than Their Secret Sauce Recipe)</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/mcdonalds-security-vulnerabilities</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/mcdonalds-security-vulnerabilities</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 17 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How I found critical security vulnerabilities in McDonald's systems affecting millions of employees, and had to cold-call their HQ pretending to know security staff just to report them.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Lovense: The Company That Lies to Security Researchers</title>
      <link>https://pentester.ca/blog/lovense-still-leaking-user-emails</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pentester.ca/blog/lovense-still-leaking-user-emails</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>How Lovense ignored critical vulnerabilities for 8+ years despite multiple researchers reporting them since 2017, exposed 11+ million users' emails through XMPP, allowed account takeovers without passwords, lied to researchers about fixes, and only patched after public exposure forced their hand.</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>